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Crerar and the Decision 
to Garrison Hong Kong 
Paul Dickson 
"Always remember that events now long in the past were once in the future." 
A crimonious and often virulent debate surrounds examinations ofthe Canadian 
expeditionary force dispatched to Hong Kong 
in the fall of 1941. The tragic fate of the Royal 
Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers 
in the battle for Hong Kong and their 
horrendous treatment at the hands of the 
Japanese following the surrender of the 
garrison has polarized opinion. Generally, 
historical treatment has ranged from C.P. 
Stacey's and J .L. Granatstein's considered 
assessments of the contemporary difficulties 
facing the political and military leaders to the 
Valour and the Horror's and Carl Vincent's 
accusations of negligence among Canada's 
political and military leadership. 1 
Major-General H.D.G. "Harry" Crerar 
was the Chief of the General Staff, the 
government's chief military advisor and senior 
army officer, when the British telegram 
requesting "one or two" Canadian battalions 
for Hong Kong was received. [See telegram on 
page 100.] "[The] Canadian Army," advised 
Crerar after several days of deliberation with 
his political masters, "should definitely take 
this on." The accepted historical perception 
has been that his strategic counsel was made 
in ignorance of the conditions of the situation 
in the Far East. Questions subsequently 
raised on the state of training of the two 
battalions chosen for the expedition further 
enhanced the belief that Crerar's actions 
were hasty and ill-considered. 
F. W. Maitland 
Despite criticisms based on the 
unforgiving perspective provided by hindsight, 
Harry Crerar's role in these decisions has 
been subject to only limited scrutiny. A 
closer examination of Crerar's background 
and training reveals a carefully constructed 
logic in his approach. Placing the decision 
within the framework of Crerar's training and 
education suggests that the three most 
important elements in his evaluation were a 
reasoned analysis of the contemporary 
strategic situation in the Far East, his long-
term objectives for the army, and the reality 
of the state of the army's training. 
* * * * * 
C rerar had a broad familiarity with the political and strategic circumstances of 
Britain's Far Eastern possessions. His 
Permanent Force career dated from 1920 and 
international affairs were prominent among 
his interests. Dedicated and ambitious, he 
held a number of senior staff positions on the 
General Staff in the interwar period that 
required a constant analysis of Canada's 
political and strategic position within the 
Commonwealth and the world. Similarly, the 
interwar educational path that marked him 
for higher command brought the specifics of 
the Far Eastern strategic situation, and that 
of Hong Kong in particular, under his purview. 
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An attack on Hong Kong and the 
implications of an Anglo-Japanese conflict 
were prominent imperial defence scenarios 
that served as staff exercises at both of the 
institutional cornerstones of the Canadian 
army's professional education system- the 
British Staff College at Camberley and the 
Imperial Defence College (I DC). Crerar 
attended the Staff College from 1922-24. Like 
his contemporaries, Vice Chief of the General 
Staff Major-General Ken Stuart and Assistant 
Chief of the General Staff Brigadier Maurice 
Pope, Crerar examined Hong Kong as a case 
study. Ironically, he did not refer to this in 
his testimony to the Royal Commission or in 
any subsequent recollections. 2 This was likely 
due to the fact that in the early 1920s Hong 
Kong's position as a strategic bastion was 
altered as the British reassessed their military 
relationship with the Japanese and their naval 
position in the Far East. The decision in June 
1921 to fortifY Singapore as the main British 
naval base and the restrictions of the 
Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 forbidding 
the Pacific powers from upgrading the 
defences of their naval bases in the western 
Pacific relegated Hong Kong to secondary 
status in the British imperial defence scheme 
for the Far East, not least because the 
Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the 
British Cabinet recognized the garrison's 
vulnerability to a landward assault. The 
strategic position of the outpost was further 
altered by the establishment of a "period of 
relief' as an accepted strategic reality in 
planning for the defence of British possessions 
in the Far East. It was, in fact, a recognition 
of Britain's inability in the 1920s to maintain 
a two-ocean navy. 3 
More influential in Crerar's assessment 
of the Far Eastern situation was his 
examination of Hong Kong in the context of 
imperial strategy when he attended the 
Imperial Defence College in 1934. A senior 
staff school designed to groom candidates for 
important roles in the strategic and military 
planning institutions of Commonwealth 
governments, the IDC was established to 
correct the perceived inadequacies in strategic 
vision that emerged during the First World 
War. 4 A series of exercises, entitled "syndicate 
wargames," were used to educate the senior 
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officers and civilians in the strategic dilemmas 
facing Britain as well as to facilitate co-
operation between the government 
departments and branches of service involved 
in modern war. 
The third syndicate wargame, in which 
all students participated, was an elaborate 
exercise in which the two syndicates, over a 
period of eight weeks, examined the relative 
political, military and economic strengths 
and potential of the Japanese and British 
Empires from both perspectives. "Exercise 
No.3," as it was blandly called, reflected the 
1934 reality of an increasingly aggressive 
Japanese policy towards China and Japan's 
growing estrangement from the western 
nations. The exercise created a fictional 
scenario set in 1936 in which the Japanese 
were forced, through domestic, political and 
economic pressures created by international 
censure and sanctions, to expand their 
possessions in China and increase pressure 
on British colonies in the Far East. This, 
according to the scenario, resulted in the 
steady deterioration of relations between the 
British Empire and Japan. It was remarkable 
how closely the exercise mirrored the actual 
development of events through to 1941. 5 
An examination of the defence of Hong 
Kong from both an operational and strategic 
perspective was undertaken by the 1934 
syndicate members as a necessary element of 
the larger exercise. The assessment, as 
reflected in the 40-page appendix and Crerar's 
personal notes, included a comprehensive 
assessment of the defensive requirements of 
the garrison and its ability to hold out prior to 
the arrival of the British Main Fleet, the 
requisite "period before relief." Hong Kong's 
precarious position was fully recognized. The 
report concluded that "in the final event the 
security of Hong Kong rested with the British 
Main Fleet." Further, it was observed that the 
existing garrison of three battalions was 
"inadequate to provide the required degree of 
security," particularly if its air and ground 
forces were left unreinforced and the British 
Empire was fighting alone, to ensure that the 
Main Fleet had time to relieve the garrison. 
The final conclusion with regards to Hong 
Kong, however, was that "the risks involved 
2
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owing to the weakness of the defences of the 
base are unjustifiable in view of the serious 
issues at stake." The "issues" were defined as 
the necessity of retaining Hong Kong as a 
forward base of operations to exert pressure 
on the Japanese and to maintain British 
prestige in the area. 6 This latter point was 
particularly important for it revealed the 
context in which the defence of Hong Kong 
would continue to be viewed up to the moment 
of the Japanese attack: a naval base designed 
to preserve British power, its real fate was 
determined by Britain's ability to project, or 
at least present the image that it could project, 
that power. 
While all were involved in drafting the 
final reports, Crerar's notes indicate that he 
was well aware of the requisite period of relief 
and vulnerability of the garrison. 7 During the 
exercise Crerar wrote an appreciation of the 
course of a Pacific war from the point of view 
of "a very Senior Staff Officer in the Japanese 
Army." From this position, he examined 
Japan's chances in the face of the combined 
economic, industrial and financial strength 
of Great Britain and the Dominions. Another 
scenario examined the possibility of an 
alliance between the United States and the 
British Empire in a Pacific conflict. 8 Crerar 
concluded that Japan would lose against 
such a combination. Consequently, Japan's 
only rational course was to avert a war with 
this coalition. A key recommendation in the 
final appreciation, one reflecting the overall 
calculations of relative strength, was that 
Britain must court the U.S. as an ally. "We 
cannot too strongly emphasise [sic]." it read, 
"the importance of persuading the United 
States of America to associate themselves 
with us against Japan." The analysis 
recognized that an American economic 
embargo would have a devastating impact on 
Japan, and that the strategic security that 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet would provide for Hong 
Kong and Britain's other Far Eastern 
possessions was a priceless asset. Co-
operation in Anglo-American policy would, so 
the writers believed, overwhelmingly secure 
British positions against the Japanese. 9 
Over the next five years, in light of 
changes in the international situation and 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, CB, DSO 
From an oil painting by T.R. MacDonald, June 1944 
(CWM 13151) 
exchanges with the Canadian foreign policy 
establishment, Crerar's assessment evolved 
to include a greater emphasis on the United 
States. He had fruitful, if discreet, discussions 
on Canada and the Far East with a small 
coterie of academic and civil servants, such 
as Lester Pearson of External Affairs and 
Escott Reid of the Canadian Institute for 
International Affairs. These discussions 
confirmed the vulnerability of Hong Kong 
which underlined the importance ofthe u .S. 1o 
Prompted by Japan's expansionist 
policies in the late 1930s, Crerar and the 
army General Staff began serious 
consideration of Canada's role in a Pacific 
war. The planners ranked the maintenance 
of Canada's neutrality in the event of an 
American-Japanese war or her commitment 
in the event of an Anglo-American-Japanese 
conflict as second in defence priorities. 11 
Crerar, as the Secretary to the Joint Staff 
Committee (JSC) and as DMO & I was an 
important architect of the priorities 
established by the General Staff. Whether he 
played a primary role in the final policy 
formulation, which seems likely, he at least 
agreed with the informed assessments that 
Canada could not avoid being drawn into a 
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T E L E G R A M 
From: The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
To: The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 
Most Secret 
Cypher LONDON, September 19, 1941 
No.162 
No. 162. Most Secret. In consultation with the late General 
Officer Commanding who has recently arrived in this country 
[Major-General Grasett], we have been considering defences of Hong 
Kong. Approved policy has been that Hong Kong should be regarded 
as an outpost and held as long as possible in the event of war in 
the Far East. Existing army garrison consists of four battalions 
of infantry, and although this force represents bare minimum re-
quired for depot assigned to it, we have thought hitherto that it 
would not ultimately serve any useful purpose to increase garrison. 
Position in the Far East has now, however, changed. Our 
defences in Malaya have been improved and there have been signs 
of a certain weakening in Japanese attitude towards us and the 
United States. In these circumstances it is thought that a small 
reinforcement of garrison at Hong Kong e.g. by one or two more 
battalions, would be very fully justified. It would increase 
strength of garrison out of all proportion to actual numbers 
involved, and it would provide a strong stimulus to garrison 
and Colony; it would further have a very great moral effect in 
the whole of the Far East and would reassure Chiang Kai Shek as 
to reality of our intention to hold the island. 
His Majesty's Government in Canada will be well aware of 
difficulties we are at present experiencing in providing forces 
which situation in various parts of the world demands, despite 
very great assistance which is being furnished by the Dominions. 
We should therefore be most grateful if the Canadian Government 
would consider whether one or two Canadian battalions could be 
provided from Canada for this purpose. It is thought that in view 
of their special position in the north Pacific, Canadian Government 
would in any case have wish to be informed of need as we see it for 
reinforcement of Hong Kong and special value of such measure, even 
though on a very limited scale at the present time. It may also be 
mentioned that the United States have recently despatched a small 
reinforcement to the Philippines. It would be of the greatest help 
if the Canadian Government could co-operate with us in the manner 
suggested, and we much hope they will feel able to do so. 
If the Canadian Government agree in principle to send one or two 
battalions, we should propose to communicate with you again as to 
best time for their despatch, having regard to general political 
situation in the Far East. 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
4
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Pacific war in which Britain was involved, 
particularly if the "Australasian" Dominions 
fought. 12 Canada's role in a Pacific war 
involving Britain and the Commonwealth 
would be far different ifthe United States was 
involved and Crerar was increasingly 
concerned with American views. He sent 
Lester Pearson a copy of a General Staff 
Memorandum dated 23 November 1936 
entitled "Memorandum on the Possible Lapse 
of Article XIX (Regarding New Bases) of the 
Washington Naval Limitation Treaty." In it 
the strategic position of Hong Kong was 
described as "leaving much to be desired" if 
Britain maintained the status quo. However, 
an important proviso stated, "Were there a 
definite alliance between Great Britain and 
the United States it is possible that this 
deterrent would more than compensate for 
the threat which new Japanese bases would 
constitute to Hong Kong." 13 
Thus developed the second crucial 
element in Crerar's perception ofthe strategic 
balance between the Commonwealth and 
Japan: the position of the United States. 
Throughout this period, Crerar was confident 
that the Americans would join the British in 
any hostilities with Japan, a confidence that 
grew through 1941 as the United States 
became more embroiled in the struggle with 
Germany and Japan. The British Empire will 
have unqualified U.S. support "before many 
weeks go by," Crerar noted in confidential 
correspondence with Price Montague in June 
1941. 14 However, he was also aware of the 
potential liability of such an alliance, 
observing before the war that "we must also 
face up to the prospect that identity in Anglo-
American policy concerning the Pacific area 
might well result in an increase in 
international friction. "15 Nevertheless, he 
clearly hoped that war in the Far East might 
be avoided if the Democracies allied and 
showed their resolve. 
Although his attention was firmly fixed 
on Europe after the outbreak of war in 
September 1939, Crerar remained well 
informed on the strategic situation in the Far 
East. In the fall of 1939, he was sent to 
London to establish an overseas Canadian 
military headquarters of which he was 
appointed Senior Officer. Initiating the 
dispatch of weekly and monthly War Office 
intelligence assessments and strategic 
summaries to Canadian Military 
Headquarters (CMHQ) and National Defence 
Headquarters (NDHQ) was an early, and 
important, achievement. As well, through 
1939-1940, he attended bi-weekly meetings 
on the war situation with the British DMO, 
Major-General Richard Dewing, which kept 
Crerar abreast of British attitudes and 
strategic estimates. 
* * * * * 
C rerar's appointment as the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in July 1940 provided 
the second strand in Crerar's approach to the 
dispatch and the context within which it was 
made. He returned to Canada to organize the 
army's expansion and training based on his 
experiences in England. 16 As CGS, keeping 
on top of strategic information was difficult 
given the myriad duties which accompanied 
the creation of a national army from scratch. 
These difficulties were magnified by the need 
to steer a cautious path through Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King's fears of repeating 
the conscription crisis of the First World War. 
Crerar, however, proved a shrewd politician 
and manuevered until he successfully gained 
the government's explicit, if hesitant, support 
for a Canadian Army formation of five full 
divisions and an armoured brigade. He also 
sought, less successfully, an expansion of 
the military's position as policy advisors, 
prerogatives long denied them by successive 
Canadian governments. 17 
The expansion of the Canadian army for 
service in Europe was the vehicle to fulfil all 
Crerar's aspirations but this proved an 
immense task through 1940 and 1941. He 
established policy for, and directed, the 
expansion and re-organization ofNDHQ, and 
set training policy for the units raised. The 
uncertainty surrounding the Canadian army's 
role also affected the pace of army expansion 
through 1940 and 1941. 18 Personality 
conflicts and professional differences within 
NDHQ further exacerbated the tense 
atmosphere that informed army 
reorganization. 19 Perhaps the biggest 
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impediment was government resistance to 
army expansion, an opposition led by the 
plodding, but politically attuned, Mackenzie 
King.2o 
Despite his political successes, by the 
summer of 1941 the inactivity of the Canadian 
army had created a sour public mood, one 
which the government leaders and the military 
were hard-pressed to quell. The army provided 
a visible target for pro-conscriptionists and 
others who equated large ground forces with 
a commitment to total war. 21 By late July 
1941, Crerar was characterized by one 
observer as "exceedingly worried" over the 
"insidious campaign" of criticism. 22 Faced 
with the need to maintain a steady flow of 
volunteers for overseas service, he urged the 
government, in addition to a government-
sponsored national recruitment campaign, 
to advocate greater involvement for Canadian 
troops overseas. "I feel it is in the interests of 
the Corps," wrote Crerar, "if not the country 
[as] there is a not unnatural desire to see 
Canadians in the headlines these days."23 
Desperate to quell the pro-conscriptionists, 
King reluctantly telegraphed Churchill 
"reaffirming the government's willingness to 
have Canadian troops serve in any theatre" 
and then set out on a speaking tour of the 
country. 24 Concrete action, however, was 
needed to dispel the malaise that was settling 
over the Canadian war effort. 
An opportunity for action soon afforded 
itself. In August of 1941, as he prepared for 
the second round of army expansion, Crerar 
met with an old Royal Military College 
colleague, Canadian-born Major-General A. E. 
Grasett. He was the former General Officer 
Commanding (GOC). British Troops in China 
passing through Ottawa on his return voyage 
to the United Kingdom. Innocuous enough 
that the exact time of the stay was not 
recorded, the discussions that took place 
between Crerar and Grasett took on a great 
importance after the fact. According to Crerar, 
the situation in the Far East and Hong Kong 
was broached in "long discussions" between 
himself, Grasett and Ralston. In the course 
of the conversations, Grasett forwarded the 
opinion that two additional battalions "would 
render the garrison strong enough to 
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withstand for an extensive period of siege an 
attack by such forces as the Japanese could 
bring to bear against it. "25 This latter 
assessment was an important confirmation 
of the prevailing viewpoint, in some circles, of 
the viability of defending Hong Kong in the 
event of a Japanese attack. 
Several years later, Crerar recalled that 
"neither to myself alone, nor to the Minister 
and myself jointly, did Grasett then raise the 
question of obtaining these two additional 
battalions from Canada. "26 The truth of this 
statement has been questioned in light of 
Grasett's subsequent suggestion to the British 
Chiefs of Staff that Canada might provide the 
necessary troops for reinforcing Hong Kong. 
However, Ralston's cautious reaction to the 
British request in September suggests that 
the Minister, at least, was not expecting this 
initiative despite the fact that he met with 
Grasett in Crerar's presence. Whatever the 
truth, stated government policy, reiterated 
by the Minister only weeks later in 
conversations with the British Secretary of 
State for War, was that "the Canadian 
government was fully prepared to sanction 
employment of the Canadian Corps in any 
military operations which the War Office might 
recommend." In obvious deference to 
Mackenzie King's concerns, Ralston added 
that "He did not wish this statement to convey 
the idea that the Canadian Government was 
pressing for the active employment of 
Canadian forces but ... that there would be 
no restrictive tendencies on the part of the 
Canadian government." In other words, not 
necessarily employment but employment if 
necessary. It would be surprising then if the 
deployment of Canadian units in some theatre 
of war had not, at least, been mentioned. 27 
Indeed, in the circumstances, neither an 
initiative by Crerar or Grasett was remarkable. 
Grasett's suggestion to Churchill and 
the Chiefs of Staff that Canada might provide 
the additional troops he believed would secure 
Hong Kong for the "period of relief' proved 
timely. 28 Months earlier and it might have 
been dismissed. However, significant shifts 
in the diplomatic and military situation had 
taken place in the Far East and Europe during 
1941, changes perceived through the filter of 
6
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Major-General A.E. Grasett 
(NAC PA 116456) 
Britain's long-standing policy of deterring 
Japanese aggression and informed by Britain's 
determination to defend her possessions in 
South-EastAsia. Of questionable practicality 
even prior to the war, Britain's chances of 
responding militarily to a major crisis in the 
Far East had decreased dramatically after 
the fall of France, the loss of the powerful 
French fleet and the subsequent necessity of 
maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean 
on her own. Nevertheless, British political 
leaders remained committed to defending the 
empire in the Far East. In hopes of deterring 
rather than encountering Japanese 
aggression, policy centred on the cultivation 
of American support, the maintenance of 
Chinese independence and occasional shows 
of military commitment. 29 The doubts in 
early 1941 about the effectiveness of this 
policy were reflected in the oft-quoted 
Churchillean assessment of January 1941 
that no troops should be sent to Hong Kong 
given its precarious position in the event of a 
Pacific war that seemed imminent. 30 Even as 
Churchill proffered this opinion, however, he 
was convinced that greater involvement by 
the United States and her Pacific Fleet would 
provide sufficient military might to deter 
Japan from attacking Western possessions. 
By the summer of 1941, the British 
were optimistic that the policies designed to 
foster deterrence were beginning to pay 
dividends. The joint American, British and 
Dutch declaration of solidarity in mid-1941 
was one result, one which the British hoped 
would have the desired effect of giving pause 
to Japan's ambitions. The main plank in the 
British policy became reality when, that 
summer, the Americans became the central 
players in the Far Eastern drama. They 
began to reinforce the Philippines, moved the 
Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour, tightened their 
economic sanctions and issued explicit 
warnings to Japan. The hardening of 
American policy towards Japan, and 
Roosevelt's enthusiastic support for 
Churchill's agenda at Placentia Bay in 
September, prompted reassessments of 
Britain's strategic position in the Far East.3 1 
Christopher Thorne's observation that "Like 
Stimson [U.S. Secretary of State]. Churchill 
believed that a flexing of Anglo-Saxon muscle 
would keep the Japanese in their place" 
reflects the sum ofBritish calculations.32 The 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee ofthe Chiefs 
of Staff (JIC) reports for August and 
September, informed by self-serving racial 
comparisons, only confirmed this optimistic 
misconception. 33 
The British government, despite 
lingering concerns over American 
equivocation, responded by tightening 
economic sanctions against Japan and, at 
Churchill's urging, promised naval 
reinforcements in the form of the battleship 
H.M.S. Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser 
Repulse, and the aircraft carrier Indomitable. 
Ignoring doubts on the part of the First Sea 
Lord Sir Dudley Pound, Churchill was 
convinced ofthe effect such a squadron would 
have. 34 He believed that the conditions for 
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providing an effective deterrent were in place 
and that Britain was required to show her 
resolve to the Americans and the embattled 
Chinese. Concurrently, strategic intelligence 
officers, despite the bloody nose inflicted by 
the Soviet Red Army on Japanese forces in 
1938-39, indicated that the Japanese might 
turn north rather than south to take advantage 
of Russian weakness.35 This assessment of 
the success of the policy of deterrence, and 
the changes wrought by Russian weakness in 
the summer, was reflected in the British 
telegram of 1941 requesting troops from 
Canada for the garrison at Hong Kong. 
Convinced that the moment should be 
seized, the British government approached 
the Canadian government on 19 September, 
informing them of the favourable changes in 
their assessment ofthe British position in the 
Far East. Given these shifts, they enquired if 
"one or two Canadian battalions could be 
provided from Canada," implying that 
Canadian troops in Britain should remain 
untouched, for the imperial outpost at Hong 
Kong. The telegram stressed that the "action 
would strengthen [the] garrison all out of 
proportion to actual numbers involved" and 
"would reassure Chiang Kai Shek as to the 
genuineness of our intention to hold the 
colony," an important objective given that 40 
of the Japanese army's 51 divisions were 
committed to the Chinese theatre. 36 They did 
not mention that Hong Kong's status as an 
"outpost" remained the same. Rather, the 
telegram implied that Hong Kong's position 
was considered safer than in recent months. 
Finally, they implied that there was some 
urgency "having regard to the political 
situation in the Far East. "37 
The decision was necessarily a political 
one. The domestic political implications of a 
refusal to dispatch Canadian troops to aid 
Britain were obvious. The arrival of the 
telegram found Ralston in the United States, 
thus the note fell under the purview of the 
Associate Minister of National Defence, 
Charles "Chubby" Power. Power, in his 
testimony to the Royal Commission of Enquiry 
in 1942, recalled that upon receipt of the 
cable he immediately "telephoned ... General 
Crerar and discussed the matter in a broad 
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and general way."38 Power followed up this 
call, meeting with Crerar on the next morning. 
Crerar, in his discussions with Power, 
noted that the dispatch of troops was 
ultimately a political as well as moral decision. 
Emphasizing the improved Far Eastern 
situation, Crerar believed that Canada had a 
moral responsibility to Britain, in the absence 
of more concrete ties. This was an important 
link in imperial co-operation. 39 The CGS 
presented this view of the political and moral 
nature of the Hong Kong decision to Major-
General Ken Stuart and Major-General 
Maurice Pope, the Vice Chief of the General 
Staff and the Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff respectively. They were in full agreement 
with Crerar's assessment. 40 
On 23 September, Power submitted the 
British request to the Cabinet War Committee 
for consideration. Decision, however, was 
deferred until the proposal could be 
thoroughly examined by the General Staff 
and Ralston. 41 Because Ralston was in Los 
Angeles, a brief was prepared on the 24th for 
his information and as a basis for discussion 
with Crerar. Written by the DMO & I, Colonel 
Richard Gibson, after talks with Crerar, the 
brief gave the impression, wrongly, that the 
government had already approved the decision 
to dispatch in principle. Gibson related the 
Cabinet War Committee's preparedness to 
accept the proposal and the fact that the CGS 
saw no "military risks in dispatching Cdn Bns 
for this purpose. "42 The inference was 
incorrect and was absent from the DMO & I's 
draft memorandum revised by Crerar on the 
afternoon of the 24th.43 Ralston nevertheless 
based his discussions with the CGS on the 
first brief and may have been labouring under 
the assumption that the War Cabinet had 
accepted the proposal. After their 
conversation in the early evening of 24 
September, in which Crerar reiterated his 
belief that the army could accept the 
responsibility, both were ready to promote 
the project. 
In Crerar's calculations, the military 
"risks" were important considerations but he 
believed the primary risk from a Canadian 
perspective was the potential impediment to 
8
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the organization of formations due for 
employment in the British Isles. The attendant 
military risks of sending troops to the Far 
East were explained in terms of the improved 
strategic situation, the strengthening of 
British bases in Malaya and the effect on 
Chinese moral which implied that Japanese 
forces would continue to be tied up in China. 
When questioned about a General Staff 
appreciation of the tactical situation of the 
Hong Kong garrison, Crerar observed to the 
Royal Commission that: 
I was not asked by the Minister or anyone 
else for such a military appreciation, nor 
did I consider that in the setting of the 
British request that such a request would 
be made. The decision for or against the 
despatch . . . necessarily required to be 
taken on the highest policy level. 44 
Crerar clearly based his decision on the 
intelligence provided by the British telegram. 
According to the testimony of the DMO & I 
and his senior intelligence officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel William Murray, up-to-date 
information on the defences of Hong Kong 
was available at NDHQ, but no formal request 
was made for the information by the General 
Staff until after the dispatch had been decided 
upon. Neither was a military appreciation of 
Hong Kong's defences in the event of a war 
requested or prepared.45 However, as the 
post-war CGS observed in 1948 "[T]here is 
nothing ... to show that the Department of 
National Defence had a staff which could 
work out the pros and cons of accepting this 
proposal ... the Canadian Authorities were 
completely dependent on information received 
from the UK. "46 An accurate observation. 
Through 1940 and 1941, despite Crerar's 
reorganization ofNDHQ, no separate general 
staff intelligence directorate was created. 
While the number of officers handling 
intelligence had increased from one in 1940 
to seven in 1941 , only one of these handled 
"foreign intelligence." Crerar's acceptance of 
the intelligence organization at NDHQ was an 
admission that it was beyond Canada's 
capabilities to start an intelligence assessment 
network from scratchY He was correct but it 
left Canada dependent on the British for 
information and, more importantly, 
assessments of that information. Limited 
information on the defences of Hong Kong 
was available at NDHQ, but such information 
was not synonymous with intelligence 
appreciations of the kind that were expressed 
in the British telegram. 
* * * * * 
T he third element in Crerar's approach to the decision to dispatch troops to Hong 
Kong involved his knowledge of the state of 
the army's training. The government did not 
formally approve the dispatch until2 October 
1941 but the selection of units was already 
underway. Crerar's choices for the units 
deployed to Hong Kong, the Royal Rifles of 
Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, derived 
from the logic that informed his advice to the 
government - that war with Japan was less 
likely than previously, that Europe was the 
main theatre and that Hong Kong was a 
garrison responsibility. 48 Crerar's 30 
September memorandum to the Minister on 
unit selection emphasized two general points 
- that the units "should be efficient, well-
trained battalions" and that the selection 
should not disrupt the training of the 4th 
Canadian Division, preparing for overseas 
service. 49 The CGS's agenda, explicit in the 
latter point, and the demands placed on an 
already strained mobilization and training 
system thus limited which trained units were 
available. Crerar could not disrupt the 
organization of forces already slated for Britain 
nor did the British want these units broken 
up. Others, including the General Officer 
Commanding of the 4th Canadian Division 
were of the same mind. 5o ' 
Crerar's estimation that hostilities with 
Japan were not imminent also guided his 
choice. It seems apparent that he believed, 
despite the assessment of Director of Military 
Training, that the two units selected were in 
need of "refresher" training. They were by his 
definition ones of "proven efficiency" and 
would suffer declines in morale if they were 
kept in Canada for prolonged periods. 
Similarly. he assumed that the garrison duties 
of Hong Kong would not differ much from that 
of the Royal Rifles' responsibilities in 
Newfoundland or the Grenadiers' duties in 
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Jamaica, observing that they were capable of 
"upholding the credit of the Dominion" in "a 
distant and important garrison." He also 
believed that the men were of a high standard, 
based on information obtained from the unit 
commanding officers and on personal 
observations on the quality of the troops. 
Both battalions had proven themselves in the 
roles allotted them and were among the most 
experienced of the available units. 5 1 
Satisfied that the units selected were 
efficient and available, Crerar, for government 
consumption, noted that the units fulfilled a 
number of domestic requirements. In addition 
to representing two distinct regions, attention 
was drawn to the fact that the Royal Rifles 
were from a French-speaking region. The 
unstated message, found in an early draft of 
the reasoning behind the selection, and one 
possibly discussed with C. G. Power, was that 
the Royal Rifles "should serve in a theatre 
where casualties are not likely to be heavy or 
sustained." The draft memorandum 
concluded "Clearly it could not long retain its 
character and identity in a main theatre of 
war for it could not be reinforced from its own 
territory. "52 Events were to prove this a tragic 
prophecy. 
Crerar's selection of units clearly 
indicates that he believed that the risks were 
minimal and that disrupting the expansion of 
formations earmarked for Europe was far 
more dangerous. Through the fall, he 
continued to mirror British optimism 
regarding Japanese intentions. Visiting 
London in October 1941, he and Ralston were 
informed that in the opinion of the British 
Joint Planning Board, an inter-service 
strategic planning committee, the "initial 
Japanese military action would be directed 
against Russia" and that, for offensive 
purposes, the "retention of Hong Kong was 
stated to be of very great importance. "53 In 
the opinion of the Canadian General Staff, 
based on the assessments provided by British 
intelligence, war with Japan was more remote 
than in any period in a number of months. 54 
The revised Army Programme for 1942, 
submitted in mid-November 1941, reflected 
Crerar's focus on expanding the army for 
deployment against Germany and the 
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optimistic assessment of the strategic 
situation in the Far East. 55 Any doubts he 
may have had were quelled by British 
assurances that should war break out "the 
U.S.A. would join us." British requests for 
speed lest the opportunity was lost left little 
time for further second guessing. 56 
* * * * * 
C rerar's estimation of the value of a small show of imperial unity was informed by 
calculations based on the strategic 
information at his disposal. Sending two 
battalions of Canadian troops, and later a 
brigade headquarters, was obviously not going 
to deter the Japanese from going to war but 
the cumulative impact of a timely show of 
Empire solidarity, in combination with 
increased U.S. involvement and enhanced 
British naval strength fitted into Crerar's 
prewar assessment of the impact of Empire 
resolve and American support. He compared 
the expeditionary force dispatched to Hong 
Kong with the British dispatch of troops to 
Greece to explain his conception ofthe factors 
behind the decision to dispatch troops to 
Hong Kong. "The proposed action," Crerar 
observed, "whatever the military risks of the 
enterprise, needed to be examined from the 
broad view as to its contributory value to the 
eventual winning of the war. "57 Confident 
that the military risks of an actual Japanese 
attack were minimal, and convinced of the 
urgency of the situation, Crerar concluded 
that "the Canadian army should definitely 
take this on."58 His assessment of Japanese 
intentions was no worse, and no better, than 
the British or American. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. belief that the Philippines could be held 
exemplifies how badly Allied strategists 
underestimated the Japanese. 59 The 
indignant tone Crerar adopted in his testimony 
to the Royal Commission and when the issue 
was raised in personal correspondence 
indicated that he was conscious of having 
misjudged the strategic situation. 
Professional considerations were also 
important, if implied, factors in the evaluation, 
factors that informed Crerar's perception of 
the political and strategic stakes of his 
decisions in the fall of 1941. In Canada, 
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Soldiers of the Winnipeg Grenadiers aboard the Awatea heading for Hong Kong. 
attention was firmly fixed on Europe and the 
static role assigned the Canadian army. With 
Dominion troops in North Africa and Britain's 
resources stretched beyond the breaking 
point, a refusal to aid in such a seemingly 
costless manner would have been 
unthinkable. Crerar was also determined to 
maximize Canada's army effort and place it 
on a more efficient basis to fulfil Canada's 
responsibilities, as he perceived them. In the 
long term he was determined to use the 
window of opportunity provided by the war to 
broaden the prerogatives of the Government's 
military advisors, to enhance their influence 
in the defence policy making process. He 
believed that the military profession's future 
prestige and position were intimately linked 
to an effective and visible army effort during 
(CFPU PMR 79-1 79) 
the war. The request for a high profile, and, 
according to strategic assessments, low-risk 
Canadian army contribution fit the bill. 
Crerar should be faulted for his failure 
to make the potential risks inherent in 
garrisoning Hong Kong absolutely clear to the 
government. This was his responsibility. 
However, Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes 
observation that the failure to call for 
intelligence assessments in the fall of 1941 
would have led to a court-martial in II 
Canadian Corps does not account for Canada's 
non-existent intelligence capabilities and 
Crerar's professional knowledge. 60 Neither 
does it capture the urgency felt by all 
participants lest the chance to deter the 
Japanese and avoid a Pacific war fade. Indeed, 
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subsequent revelations indicate that the 
British were correct in their assessment of 
the importance of maintaining Chinese morale 
at this critical juncture, and thus tying down 
the bulk of the Japanese army, even if their 
intelligence miscalculated the magnitude of 
Japanese irrationality. The Americans made 
the same mistake. Crerar followed suit. 61 
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